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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORLO S. MA \Y, R. .JOHN MAW, ( 
and VADEL T. MA\\~, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, . 
Case 
· No.10823 
IVEBER BASIN "r ATER ) 
vs. 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Defendant and Resp01ident. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The respondent does not agree with the appellants' 
statement of facts. Very pertinent facts are omitted 
from, and unsupported conclusions and argumentative 
statements are included in, the appellants' brief. We 
submit our own statement. The appellants are referred 
to as the "plaintiffs" and the respondent is referred to 
as the "defendant." 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Ogden Duck Club, a corporatiou of the State 
of Utah, leased Sections 1 and 12, Township 7 North 
' 
Range 3 ·west, from the State of Utah upon which they 
established a club house and shooting facilities. (R. 39, 
Tr. 33). 'l1he Ogden Duck Club was the successor in in-
terest to the Lakeshore Duck Club (R. 39, Tr. 37) and 
the Duck Club contended that it had established a right 
of way by usage for 30, 40 ·or 50 years (R. 39, Tr. 49). On 
December 29, 1936, Annie C. Maw and the Ogden Duck 
Club, a Utah corporation, entered into a right of way 
agreement, whicli is set out in full as an appendix to 
Appellant's Brief herein (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). Of the 
four sons of Annie C. Maw named in the agreement Wil-
mer J. Maw died in 1953 (R. :39, Tr. 5), Rufus J. :Maw 
died in 1949 (R. 39, Tr. 20), Gilbert E. Maw died in 1954 
(R. 39, Tr. 24), and George C. Maw is the sole survivor. 
(R. 39, Tr. 5 ). 
Eugene Maw, Orlo S. Ma,,-, and Farrell J. Maw are 
sons of "Wilmer J. Maw; R. John Maw and Junior D. 
Maw and sons of Rufus .J. Maw; and Yirgil B. Ma\v and 
Vadel T. Maw are sons of Gilbert E. Maw (Amended 
Complaint and Answer). The Appellants herein are 
Orlo S. Maw, one of the sons of "Wilmer J. Maw, R. John 
Maw, one of the sons of Rufus Maw, and Vadel T. Maw, 
one -0f the sons of Gilbert E. Maw (R. 4). 
The 1936 right of way agreement describes the lo-
cation of the right of way: ''Gran tor does hereby give 
and grant unto grantees and their successors in interest 
2 
a convenient right-of-\Yay oYer arnl ar·rns::; said lands for 
the purpose of going 1o and from the cluh lwuse owned 
liy Grantees in Section ] 2, T. & N., R. 3 \\' .... " The lo-
,·ation of this right-of-\rn,\· is sl10wn 0;1 Defendant's Ex-
hibit 3. The 193G agreement descrihcs that part of the 
rig-ht-of-way to be maintained in a traYelable condition 
h,\· the grantor as "a part of the right-of-way herein 
granted to Grai1tees, 110\Y existing in said 8ection 20, 
T. i N., R. 2 \\7 ., Salt Lake .'.\f eritlian along the north 
rocl of the east half of said sediol! .... " This half-mile 
~ection of road to he maintained b,\· Annie C. Maw was 
not iuC'luded in the lancl pnrehase eontrad (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit D) nor the warranty deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
E). 
The allegations and admissions in the pleadings 
establish that the United States of America, Bureau of 
Hedamation, in conjunction with the \Yeher Basin \Vater 
Conservancy District, determined it was neC'essary to 
acquire approximately 1,000 acres from \\T .. J olm Maw 
and Sons, Inc., a corporation, and Grace B. Maw for the 
construction of the Willard Reservoir (R-4, Tr. 15). \Y . 
. John Maw and Sons, Ine. and Grace B. Maw were the 
owners of the land to be acquired by the United States 
(R-39, Tr. 6). Neither George Maw nor any of the 
cousins, the sons of Rufus or Gilbert, owned any stock 
er interest in the lands (R-39, Tr. 6). \Y. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc. and Grace B. Maw still owns other property 
south of the property acquired by the United States 
(R-39, Tr. 6). 
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The allegations aud admissiom; iu the pleadings dis. 
dose that the road through the properties acquired by 
the United States from Urace D. Maw and \V. John Maw 
and Sons, Inc., a torporatiou, was ohliterated and de-
stroyed <luring the tonstruction of the \\'illard Resen-oir 
and that an alternate access road \ms provided for the 
Ogden Duck Club (R-4, R-lG). The State leases of the 
Ogden Duck Club in their old loeatio11 were c-ancelled and 
a new lease obtained from the State of etah for a quarter 
section of ground for parking faC'ilities and where their 
buildings are relocated (R-3~), Tr. 4:1). The Ogden Duck 
Club moved its duh house aliout a mile aud a half west 
because its shooting grounds were used for the Willard 
Bay Reservoir. Since the move it has not use<1 the right-
of-way through the property formerly owned by \V. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc. an<l Oracc B. ).iaw, and it now has 
access over a public road on Government land (R-39, Tr. 
41, 42, 47). The :Maws did not do any maintenance work 
on the half-mile lane. The Ogden Duck Club graveled and 
scraped it every year (R-39, Tr. 34), obtained assistance 
from -weber County and Box Elder County, built up the 
road, and later graded the entire road (R-39, Tr. 49 and 
50). The right-of-,rny agreement was for the mutual 
benefit of the Ogden Duck Club and Annie C. Maw and 
her successors in interest (R-39, Tr. 49). In 1956 the 
United .States and \Veber Basin \Yater Conservancy Dis-
trict initiated negotiations with ·w .. John Maw and Sons, 
Ine. and Grace B. Maw for the acquisition of approxi-
mately 1,000 acres to be used for the construction of the 
-Willard Bay Reservoir (R-39, Tr. 6). The President of 
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\\-.• John ~la\v and Sons, 111<'. requested that lettl>rs l>e 
preparc•d ''to protel't our interest in regards to seYerance 
rights, hunting privileges, arnl a right-of-wa~- which \\·e 
bad given to tlw Ogden Duc-k Clnh (R-:m, 'l'r. /)." ::\lr. 
~la\\' met with ::\Ir. E .• T. Ske('ll, attonwy for Wl•her Basin 
\Yater Couserrnucy Distrid, in the Village gnilding in 
the Office of the Bureau of Hedamation ( H-:~9, Tr. 9) . 
. \ rough draft of a letter \\'as prepared \\'hich Orlo .J. 
~la\\- asked .Jir. Skeen to \\'rite to protect their interests 
ii' they signed the eontrad with the United States Gov-
ernment (R-:39, Tr. 10, Exhibit B). Snhscqnentl~, five 
~eparate letters were prepared hy ~fr. Skeen and signed 
hy F,. .T. Fjeldsted (Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, R-39, Tr. 11). 
Each letter was on the stationery of the \Veber Basin 
\Yater Conservancy District, each dated .July 5, 1957. 
1'hrec of the letters were addressed to: 
"\¥. John Maw and Sons, Inc. 
Plain City, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
Tracts Nos. 95, 104 and 106, \Yillard Dam and 
Reservoir, W. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC.'' 
The other two 0opies were addressed to' 
"Grace B. Maw 
Plain City, Utah 
Dear .Mrs. Maw: 
Tract Nos. 95, 104 and 106, Willard Dam and 
Reservoir, W. JOHN MA vV AND SONS, INC." 
The balance of each letter is identical and reads as fol-
lows: 
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"It is our understanding that you have exe-
eutec1 a contract for the sale to the United State~ 
of Tracts Nos. 95, 104 and lOG, -Willard Dam and 
Reservoir. 
This letter will assure you that the land pur-
<'llai"e contract does not eover your other property 
in the -Willard Bay area, and specifically you.r 
state leases, water rights, easements, licenses, 
duck club shooting privileges or land other than 
those described in the land purchase contract. 
Any such property interest which will be required 
in the construction of the dam or ·which will be 
damaged or destroyed will be appraised at a later 
date and an offer to purchase will be made. 
Very truly yours, 
s/d E. J. Fjeldsted 
E. J. Fjeldsted 
Manager'' 
Following the delivery of the letters the land pur-
chase contract between the United States of America and 
Grace B. Maw and ,V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., dated 
July 15, 1957 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit D) was executed by 
the corporation and Grace B. Maw (R-39, p. 13). Article 
3 of said contract (Plaintiffs' Exhibit D) provides: 
'' 3. The Vendor shall sell and by good and suffi-
cient deed with covenants of warranty convey to 
the United States free of lien or encumbrance, 
except as ,otherwise provided herein, the follow-
ing described real estate situated in the Counties 
of Box Elder & -Weber, State of Utah, to-wit: ... 
"3a. It is understood and agreed that the 
rights to be conveyed to the United States as de-
scribed in article 3 hereof shall be free from lien 
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or encumbrance exC'ept: (i) <·oal or mineral rights 
reserved to or outstanding in third parties as of 
the date ·Of this contrart; and (ii) rights-of-,rn~· 
for roads, (includjng the right-of-way granted to 
the Ogden Duck Club across Tract 93), railroads, 
telephone lines, transmission lines, difrhes, con-
duits or pipelines, 011, over or across said lands 
in existence on such date. 
Subsequent thereto on September 19, 1957 a \V arranty 
Deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit E) was executed by the cor-
poration and Grace B. ,,ia '" pursuant to the above land 
purchase contract. 
The President of \\'. John l\law aud Sons, Inc. later 
during the same year contacted l\lr. E .. J. Skeen respect-
ing the shooting rights (R-39, Tr. 15). Mr. George l\law 
contacted Mr. J. Stuart .Mcl\Laster, Field Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior of the lJnited States Govern-
ment and received a letter (R-39, Tr. 17 and 18, Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit F). 
On April 7, 1958 the Ogden Duck Club as grantor 
executed a Quit Claim Deed to Grace B. Maw and \V. 
John Maw and Sons, Inc., as grantees, conveying all of 
its right, title and interest in and to the identical land 
conveyed by the vVarranty De eel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit E) 
and the land described in the purehase contract with the 
United States (Plaintiffs' Exhibit D). The Quit Claim 
Deed made it possible for the Maws to obtain their set-
tlement with the United States Government on their 
property (Eubank deposition, p. 54). The Ogden Duck 
Club excluded the Maws from the use of its facilities 
(Eubank deposition, p. 59). 
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'I'his adion \ms commencc•d agai11st both the Ogden 
Duck Club a11d the \\'c•her Ba,;i11 \Yater Conservam~· 
District to reconr the value of' dm·k sl1ooting privilege~. 
The trial <·ourt dismissed the complaint on a motion for 
a summary jutlgment. The plaintiffs appealed. Thi, 
Court affirmed the Distriet Court's holding that the 
Ogden Duck Club was not respom;ihle for breach of con-
tract (George C. Maw v. lVebcr Basin Water Consen-
ancy District a11rl O,r;de11 Duck Club, 15 Utah 2d 271: 
:191 P.2d at page :301). Grace B . .Jlaw and \\T. John ~law 
and Sons, I1w. are not parties plaintiffs herein. The 
Ogden Duck Club is 110 longer a party to the lawsuit and 
the United States of Amerira has not been joined ai,; a 
party defendant. 
After the ease was remanded for trial, the com-
plaint was amended by adding allegations relating to 
the execution and delivery by the Ogden Duck Club of 
the Quit Claim Deed mentioned above and by adding a 
prayer for punitive damages. (R. 4, p. 4). The defendant 
moved to strike those portions ·of the complaint relating 
to the claims of grandsons and to punitive damages. (R. 
7, p. 1). The motion was taken under advisement and 
was not ruled upon until the trial. A jury determined the 
fair market value of the shooting privilege of George C. 
Maw. The court entered judgment for George C. Maw 
for the amount so determined, but denied relief to the 
other plaintiffs. This appeal was taken by three of the 
seven grandsons of Annie C. Maw named in the com-
plaint. 
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STATE~IEN'r OF P<HXTS 
J. '1'1111~ PLAIN'l'H'FS ilA\'E 1\(J HI<;I-ITS 
l':\DER TI!J1~ 19:36 AOHEK\JE;..rT ~\XD 'l'IIE TRL\L 
('OPHT DID XO'r CO,\IMlT I1:RHOH \\TU1:l\' rr R1'~­
rm.;11:D TO SUBMI'l' TO TIIJ•: .JURY Till<: JSSlTJ1~ 
.\S TO THE COXSTRUCTIO~ OF Tl! J1~ AGHEE-
,\fENT. 
~. THE 'l'RL\L COUHT PROPI<:RLY REFUSI~D 
TO SUBl\lIT '11 0 THE .JLTRY 'l'HE THIRD-P~\RTY 
BE~EFICIARY ISSUE. 
:3. THI~ ISSUE ON Pl:NITIYI~ J),_\.JLA<iES \L\S 
PROPERLY EXCLUDED. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PLAINTIFFS HA YE N"O RIGHTS UN'-
DER THE 1936 AGREEMENT AND THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR ·wHF:N IT RE-
FUSI~D TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE 
AS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AGREE-
MENT. 
Tbe plaintiffs' claims for compensation for shoot-
ing priYileges on the Ogdeu Duck Club area which they 
contend were taken from them by the defendant at the 
time ·of the construction of the \Villard Bay Reservoir 
arc predicated on the 1936 agreement. See appendix to 
t!Je Appellants' Brief. N 011e of the plaintiffs are parties 
to the agreement and none are suecessors in interest to 
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Annie C. Maw. None of the plaintiff::; were landowner.' 
in the \Yillard Bay area. Their elairned rights are a.~. 
sertecl as third-party beuefi.eiaries under the 1936 agree-
ment. 
Ead1 plain ti ff is a grandson of Annie C. Maw - a 
son of each of Annie C. Maw's deeeased sons who arr: 
named in the agreement which provides: 
'' ... In consideration of non-assessable shoot-
ing privileges on said shooting grounds of Gran-
tees 011 days excepting the opening day, Saturdays, 
Sunda:-·.~, and holidays, to be cnJoyed by, and 
hereby r;ranted to, the sons of Grantor named a,, 
follou·s, to-wd: 
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Ma1r, 
and George Maw, Grantor agrees to maintain in a 
travelable condition the road which is a part of 
the right-of-way herein granted to Grantees, now 
existing in said Section 20, Township 7 North, 
Range 2 \Vest, Salt Lake Meridian along the 
North rod of the East half of said sechon; pro-
vided that in any year the said Wilmer J. Maw, 
Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw, and George Maw may 
designate one son for each thereof to shoot and 
enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such 
son's father; but it is expressly understood that 
blinds on the shooting grounds of Grantees being 
used at any time by said sons shall be given up to 
members of the Ogden Duck Club upon request 
... " (Emphasis added). 
The agreement specifically provides that the privi-
leges are granted ''to the sons of Grantor". The only 
reference to the grandsons is found in the proviso whicl1 
reads: 
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" ... providPd that i11 any .i;rar lhe saicl \Yilmcr 
,J. Maw, Rufus ~law, Oilhert nLnY and (;coroc 
::"llaw may designate ~ne son for each thereof 'to 
shoot and enjoy tlie J>ri\·ilcµ;e lter0u1Hlcr in place 
1. l ' [' t I '' ( 1·' . o sue 1 son s a ier . . . 1,mphas1s added). 
Tlic i11t<·nt is clear that the grallt of pri,·i]ege 1Yas 
10 the sons of Gm11tor with tl1e riqlit i11 a11,1; !Jl'ar for the 
~on to clesignate one ·of his sons to f-lhoot i11 his place. lt is 
fllrther clear that aftn the dcnth ol' a son there could 
1w no designation i11 aJ1y .i;car, so the priYik·ge 1Youlcl he 
There is 110 evideil<'c that any cle<'cascd sou of A1mic 
l'. :dnw clesiguatccl a pal'ticnlnr son to sl10ot i11 hi:,; place 
i11 any year or at all. 'There is no evidence that a11.v plain-
tiff succeeded to the shoot i11p; priYilege of his father, 
whether it lie a proper!)' right, or a C'ontrad right, by 
will or h)· suecession urnler state la\Y. The e·,·idence is un-
disputed that each deeeasecl son of )1.1rnie C. Maw had 
hrn or more sons. (R. 39, Tr. 27-29). There is nothing 
in the record to shO\Y how the three 'plaintiffs 1rnre se-
leetec1 as the recipients of' the shooti11g pri\'ileges out of 
;1 total of seYen grand~.ons. The law is, clear that property 
rights arnl contract rights can be transferred only by 
dee(l or assignment during lifetime, and b:v \~rill or by 
Htatntory 8Uccession after death. The record is entirely 
~ilent as to how the appellant, Orlo S. ::\!cm·, instead of 
his brothers, Eugene and Farrell (who did not appeal) 
ohtained his right as a s1weessor to \Yilmer ::\law; as to 
how the appellant, R. .John ~law, instead of his brother 
Junior B. l\faw (who did not appeal) obtained his right 
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as a successor to Rufus Maw; or as to how the appellant, 
Vadel T. Maw, instead of his hrother \Tirgil B. J\Iaw (who 
did uot appeal) obtained his right as successor to Gilbert 
K Maw. 
The Trial Court found: 
'' ... 4. That ·said agreement dated December 
29, 1936 does not by its terms or by interpreta-
tion nor usage established over a period of years, 
or at all, run to the benefit of each and all of the 
plaintiffs, but benefits only the plaintiff George 
C. Maw . . . " (Findings of Fact No. 4, p. 6 of 
findings, R. 38). 
Although the trial court permitted the plain tiffs tu 
adduce evidence as to usage, arts and conduct to show 
construction of the ] 936 agreement by the parties, and 
testimony was given (R. 39, Tr. 19-30), the court made 
no finding that the agreement was ambiguous. He prop-
erly refused to submit to the jury the issue as to the 
meaning of the agreement. (R. 39, Tr. 57 ( c) ) . The 
court's finding quoted above is supported by the evi-
dence. Its refusal to submit a legal issue to the jury is 
fully supported by the law. 
The trial court held there was no jury is·sue present 
as to interpretation of the 1936 agreement: 
"THE COURT: And so we wouldn't give it to 
the jury anyway unless there was a eonflict of 
facts. 
MR. FULLER: vVell, we don't care on that just 
so long as it's well understood that there's 
12 
no confli<'t and 1 IH• <lll:-i\\.l'I' to that is yes, so 
\ll;I( till' ('OllJ't <'ill! (;1k(' i( frill!! \ JiL'l'L'." 
(lCl!l, p. ~Jl(l>)) 
111 A'imiko 7'01110 \'. ( ·1a/1 1' 1111' r J !.u1/1/ ( '1,., 1:.2 
rtal1 :.2d 218, :l!i:) l'.:.2d I~~.;, t lw rnk ;1 I io\\·i11g ;1 co mt to 
takP a l!laltn l'rom ;1 ,illr.\· i:-; "l'( rJ11t Oll p;1·~e I !I:~. 1'.:.2d, a" 
\'11llows: 
•• ... ,\.ind.~(· i:-; P-'-'!l('rall.Y allo\\Pd to withdra\\. 
;1 c·asl' l'rorn a jUJ'\' \I liL•n·n·r t l1ne i:-; i11snffi<'i<·ut 
<'ornpeicnt, releva11t arnl material c•\·i1le1H·L• to s11p-
pnrt tlH~ isstH', 01· \\'hen~ the L'\'ide11<'<• i . ;; 1·0Htrnr.\· 
111 all reaso1iable prolJahili!ies or is urn·ontro-
yerted. '' 
ThC' same rule \rn:-; a1111ou11<·ecl h.v tlii:-; Court in llall 
\. /Jlackham, 18 Utah :2d 1 (j.f, 411 P.:.2d GG-l, 011 page (j(j(j 
I' .:.2cl : 
''Where the trial i:-: by jury it is !he provinec 
of thC' <'On rt to <keicle questio11 of bw i!S dist i11-
guished from c1uestions of fad. 111 thL• perforrn-
auee of that duty it is incmnhent upon the comt 
to instruct the jury on the la\v applicahle to the 
theories of parties insofar as :-;ueh theories are 
,.;upported h>· some e\·idence. " 7here the evidence 
is such that all reasonable minds ·would agree, 
there is no substantial dispute aucl thus no issuC' 
of fact for the .im>' to determine, a11cl the eonrt 
rules as a matter of law." 
"THE COURT: "'ell, let me state it thi~ wa~" 
though. Is there any eonfiict of evidence for 
the jnry to find a11yway? 
MR. FULLER: I don't think there's auy C'Oll-
ftict. '' 
(R39, p. 57(a)) 
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There being no conflict in the testimony, and henee 
no jury question, the court had the duty to determine the 
issue as a matter of law. 
Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a con-
tract the court cannot consider extraneous evidence and 
is bound to enforce the contract i11 accordance with the 
intent expressed therein. 
Ephriam Theater Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 
321 P.2d 221. 
The plaintiffa do not point out any ambiguity 
or uncertainty in the 1936 agreement and we belien 
there is none. Their argument on this point is based en-
tirely on certain general language in this Court's opin-
ion on the previous appeal from an order granting a 
summary judgment for the defendants. This general lan-
guage is as follows : 
"However, we cannot agree with the other 
conclusions of the court.'' 
The Court then made the following significant statement 
to support its reversal of the summary judgment: 
''There can be no doubt that at the time the 
land purchase contract with the United States 
was executed, George C. Maw, one of the appel-
lants and a named son in the 1936 'Right of Way 
Agreement' was entitled to the shooting privi-
leges provided therein." M anv v. Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District, 15 Utah 2d 271, 391 
P.2d 300 at page 302. 
This Court did not have before it on the previous 
appeal any testimony whatever and had before it no 
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findings and conclusions o[ the trial court. The legal 
effect of the reversal was to set aside a summan· J'udo·-
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rnent and to direct that the case be tried on its merits. 
This Court did not tell the trial eourt how to decide the 
legal and factual issues which might or might not be 
encountered during the trial. 
If the rights under this agreement are in the nature 
of an easement in gross in the shooting grounds of the 
( lgden Duck C1ub then such rig'hts are so exclusively 
personal that they are not assignable or inheritable. 
They are so personal that they cannot take another in 
rompany with them. Ernst v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 184 P. 
827. 829. Even if the right be created by a document of 
conveyance it is personal to the named sons and is not 
a~signable or inheritable. Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 
S5 P.2d 861. 
The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to testify 
that they and their brothers had shot ducks on the Ogden 
Duck Club since the deaths of their fathers and that 
'rhen they were boys they accompanied their fathers on 
duck hunts. (R. 39, Tr. 8, 9, 20-22, 25-30). Mr. Eubank 
testified that there was a very cordial relationship with 
the Maw family and that as a matter of courtesy they 
were permitted to shoot on the club. (R. 39, Tr. 36-38). 
We quote: 
"We liked the boys. If the boys came out-I 
don't know of ·the young·er boys ever shooting out 
there at the time when they were young. And if 
they did, I never saw them. But the facilities of 
the club was for the members. I mean, the inner 
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fal'ilitic:-; of the~ <'lull w;i:-; l'or tlic· rnc111lwr:-;. I do11·1 
:-;a:· 1lw1 Hufus or \\"ilim•r \ms llCH'l' i1ffited illt11 
tlw cluli hou:-;e, lic•cau:-;e at times they \Vere. But it 
wa:-; a purel:· social gl':-;tnre 011 lielialf of the me111-
1Jers or :-;omc ol' the mc•111hL•h who happem•d ti, 
l1nH' hee11 there at that time." 
''(~ . . \re you a<'quaillh'd witi1 H. .John :'llaw a!lll 
\'aclel :'llaw \\·ho ju:-;t testified: 
.\. I am with \'adel. I gue:-;s 1 know l\. .Johu. J 
don't know whether I do or i10t, to be hone~t 
with you. l know Yaclcl, .''es. 
(~. I )o .'·ou reeall t'itlicr ol' ihc boys <:u·eompany-
inµ; their fathers, shooting on the club at the 
same time as their fathers? 
A. Personally I do not. 
Q. Diel the dub cn'r exteml any courtesies on 
the shooting? 
A. Oh, sure. I mean, I don't think any of the boy~ 
were en'r tun1ecl clown if they eame out thel'l' 
and wanted to go out to shoot, lmt it 'Nas a 
pure eourtesy situation. I don't think there 
was ever a thought of a contract involved or 
anything else." (R39, Tr. 37-38) 
'11 he trial eourt properly held that this general evidemt· 
did not create any factual issue. (R.39, Tr. 57 a, b, c.). 
There were ob,·iousl:-· man:· reas011s for permitting the 
lioys to shoot. 
Orlo S . .\la\Y, H. .John .\law and Yadel T. Ma\\". 
the plaintiffs herei11, \\·ere i10t parties to the 1936 agree-
ment, hnt h:· their own self serving testimony are at-
tempting to heeome beneficiaries of that agreement. 
Their interpretatio11 of what they want the eontrad 
to he is 11ot competent c\·ide11<·t>. Their testimony is that 
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they hunted as soon as they were okl enough, had 
worked for the dub and stayed on the duh with their 
friends and relatives who were the caretakers of the 
·l 1 (R 39 20 •)') ·)') ')"" 9(' ·)- · 1 ')<).) Tl · . · CU) ·. , pp. , -~, -oJ, ~a, - ), -1 cllH -· . lele lS 
JJO evidence that the parties interpreted the 19:36 agree-
ment so as to extend the benefits thereof to plaintiffs 
herein. 
To warrant the court in adopting a practical con-
strnetion by the parties it is necessary that each party 
~hall have placed the same construction on the contract. 
Hodges Irr. Co. v. S1ca11 ()reek Canal Co., 111 Utah 405, 
181, P.2d 217, 220. 
Plaintiffs say that the letter of the defendant to 
\\- . .Tohn Maw and Sons, Inc. and Grace B. :Maw is an 
admission that the grandsons of Annie C. Maw used the 
shooting grounds of the duck club and hence that they 
\1ere beneficiaries under the 1936 agreement. The de-
fendant was not a party to the agreement and its sup-
posed interpretation is not material here. The letter 
does not contain any interpretations of the 1936 agree-
ment at all. Likewise the letter from J. Stuart :M:cMaster, 
Field Solicitor, U. S. Department of the Interior, to 
George C. Maw, is recited for the same purpose. The 
United States was not only not a party to the 1936 
agreement and is not a party to this lawsuit, and obvi-
ously cannot aid the plaintiffs. 
The evidence before the court was not in conflict 
and such that reasonable minds could not differ on its 
effect and the court correctly held there was no jury 
17 
issue and <·onc<'11.\- h·ld 1J1:1t ilil' 11l;tilltif'L ,,·ere· 11o1 
l1e11cf'ieiaric...; under the 1;n1; <1:'_~1·c<•mcnl. 
'l'lie trial court's re!\1:-;;1] 1o snl>lnit the c011tract 
constructi011 issue 10 tlie jur_\·, and its finding- that son, 
of deceased sow; ha\·e no l'i\.;lits llll<ler the rn;~(j agree-
ment must lie snst:iillcd heean>'<', (1) the plaintiffs haw 
not pron~cl that the_\' are :-;rn·r·cs:-;ors iu iHterest of the 
right to shoot or were rle:-;i.~·11akd IJ)' tlic dcreased sons 
as rec-ipieuts of the rights; ('.2) tl:c l!YHi agreoment i.' 
not arnLignons ancl graut:-; 110 rip;ht to :-;on:-; of clet'easecl 
sons after the deatl1 of such deceac;ed :-;ons, and (~I 
there wac; 110 competent L'>:trn11c•ous eYidence that tlii· 
plaintiffs \\·en~ intended to Hl<'CCl'd to the shooting priYi-
leges. 
:2. r1_111E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO SFBMIT TO TIIE .JURY THE TJURD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY ISSUE. 
~\t the co])('lusion of the trial the plaintiffs requested 
the f'onrt to sulnnit to the .inr_\· the following special 
intenogaton·: 
"2. Did Orlo Maw, at the time he execn ted the 
sale of the lands in the ~Willard Bay area, enter 
into an agreement with the ~T eber Basin \Vater 
Conservaney District whereby the latter agreed 
to pay for 'shooting privileges' of Mavv family 
members other than George C. 1\fa1y ~ '' 
This request 1rns denied. 
The plaintiffs argue under Point II of their brief 
(p.26) that the Fjelclstcd letter, dated .July r-i, 1957, con-
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:;titutes an agreement to pay for shooting priYileges of 
orandsons, Chlo Maw, R. .John Maw and Vadel T. Maw e 
\\'hether or not they aetually had shooting privileges 
11 nder the 1936 agreement. Their theory is that the 
Jetter evidenced a new contract that created new rights 
i11 the appellants to shoot ducks on the Ogden Duck Club. 
Sec p. 34 of Appellants' Brief where it is stated: 
"At tbis juncture it should be pointed out that, 
eYen if some doubt could have existed as to 
whether or not the Maws of the second genera-
tion, i.e., the grandsons of Annie C. Maw, were 
entitled to the dnek club shooting privileges, that 
doubt was resolved and a new contractural ar-
rangement was entered into by the \Veber Basin 
·water Conservancy District in the form of a 
third-party beneficiary contract. Tliis is so be-
cause .. W. John Maw and Sons, Inc. gave up its 
rights to litigate the matter of C'Ompensation in a 
court ,of law in exchange for the recognition and 
protection of the duck shooting privileges in the 
Ogden Duck Club ... '' 
This claim was not pleaded and was not included 
m any pre-trial discussion until November 21, 1966, 
Eight days before the trial. (R. 39, Tr. p. 4). 
The letter (Pl. Ex. C) contains no language which 
by the greatest stretch of imagination can be construed 
to support such a contention. It must be recalled that 
it is addressed to ·w. John Maw and Sons, Inc. and to 
Grace B. Maw, the owners of the land acquired by the 
United States for the \V-illard Bay Reservoir. It says 
in the second paragraph: 
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"This letter will assure that the land pur<'hasl· 
contract does not cover your other property in-
terests in the Willanl Bay Area, aucl speeifil'alh 
~·our state leases, water rights, easements, Ji. 
cellses, drn·k club shooting privileges, or lalld, 
other t lrn n those described in the la ml purC'ha'1 
('011tract. Any such property interests which will 
be n•quiretl in the C'OnstruC'tion of the Dam or 
which will be damaged or destroyetl will be ap 
praised at a later elate ancl an offer to purelrn~e 
will lie made.'' 
It will he notecl that rn line two of the exC'erpt i: 
1·efers to '' yonr other r>roperty interests in the 1iYillar<l 
Bay Area." Clearly these arc existing property in-
terests, ancl t lie re is 110 i11 tc11 t ion ex pressed in the letter 
to create new ''property interests'' including duck 
shooting priYilcges. Furthermore, it is ohYious that tl1~ 
District hatl no ant hori t:· to ('l'ea tr d nck shooting priYi-
leges in the Ogtlen Duck Club ( O\'Cr which it hacl no 
control) for the sok purpose of taking them for the 
project ancl of paying for them. The mere statement of 
the plaintiffs' argument refutes it. 
The letter simply and clearly state::; that the land 
purchase contract cloes not cover state leases, water 
rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting privileges 
or lands other than those clescrihetl in the contract, aurl 
further, that if snch proverty interests are required 
for the project they will appraised and an offer to 
purchase will he made. The plaintiffs do not conteml 
that the land purchase l'Ontract actually covers the duck 
shooting- privileges, bnt the:· claim that in some myster-
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ions way that the letter created duek shooting privileges 
in grandsons, who as shown above, are not beneficiaries 
of the 1936 agreement and are not mentioned in the 
Jetter. 
The testimony of Orlo S .. I\Iaw (R. 39, Tr. 5-16) 
does not support the third-party beneficiary contract 
theory of creation of ne1Y rights to be paid for by the 
District. Judge Cowley properly held that as a matter 
of law the Fjeldsted letter <lid not create new property 
rights but obligated the District only to pay for the 
existing George C. Maw right. The jury was instructed 
to determine the value of the George C. ~.law right. The 
ya]ue was found to be $2040.00 as of the elate of taking. 
This amount with interest was paid and the significance 
of the Fjeldsted letter has now become moot. 
3. THE iSSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES "WAS 
PROPERLY EXCLUDED. 
The claim for exemplary or punitive damages herein 
is contained in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint 
(R. 4). The defendant moved to strike paragraph 10 
and paragraph 2 of the prayer of the amended complaint 
(R. 7). At the pre-trial on November 21, 1966 the court 
ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: " ... And what next? Punitive 
damages~ 
MR. SKEEN: On the matter of punitive damages 
you remember I briefed the question very 
fully, and if this is a contract theory the law 
is pretty clear that you can't give punitive 
damages. 
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THE C'Ol'RT: \\'ell, I'm going to hold for you o1 
t!tat and let 1f r. Fuller take his cxceplirm j, 
it, make his record. 
1TH. FULLER: Alright." (R. 38, p. 4). 
The i:-;sm• of trespass 11po11 and destruction of prop. 
erty rights was not pleaded. 
Assumiug as we mu:-;t that the• allegations rnntained 
111 the amcmlcd c·omplaint are i me, then the ads re1ic1'. 
upon m paragraph 10 are: 
" 
"Defendant ea used to be prepared a quit elairn 
deed from the Ogde11 Duek Cl uh to TY. ,John Ma/I 
and S(Jns a11d Grace lJ. Jllaw of t!tc identical real 
properties included in the origi11al warranty deer! 
from them, to the United States of America .. 
but the same was not at any time delivered to ... 
the grantees ... defendant eaused said deed to he 
recorded, but did so for the sole and exclusiw 
purpose of clearing the title of the United States 
... upon reeording said deed and by the Doctrine 
of after-acquired title ... all the real property 
rights of W .. John Maw and Sons, Inc. and Grace 
B. Maw, or either of them, or of any of the plai11-
tiff s herein, thereby became extinguished." R. 4, 
p. 4). (Emphasis added.) 
From and after the elate of the \\'arranty Deed to 
the United States dated ;-;eptember rn, 1957 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit E) the l\Iaws did not own any right, title or 
interest, or right of possession of the property oYer 
which the right of way of the Ogden Dnek Club ran. 
The rights of the Ogden Duck Club conveyed to ·w . 
• John Maw and So11s lne. and Ornrc B. ~la"· by the 
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l~uit Claim Deed dated April 8, 1~};)8 (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit B, under offer of prnof in the prior appeal) passed 
liy the af ter-acqniretl tit le doctrine to the l' ni tecl States. 
The plaintiffs were not parties to tlic larnl purchase 
l·ontract, \Y arranty Deed or the (2ui t Claim Deed and 
ii' they had any rights in snC'h land they still have such 
rights for strangers could not conny their rights. 
For plaintiffs to sustain a claim that defendant is 
trespassing on or has destroyed their property rights 
ihey must affirmatively show that they had a property 
right involved. See 52 Am. ,J ur. Trespass Sec. 21, p. 851, 
87 C.J.S. Trespass, Sec. 21, P. 972. In Salt Lake City v. 
East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah ] 26, 121 P. 5!)2, 598 
!his court announced the following rule: 
"In making compensation for taking or dam-
aging property by the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain, two elements must be consid-
ered: (1) is there any property taking or dam-
aged in fact; and (2) if so, what is the value in 
dollars, or in case it is only damaged, what is the 
money value of the damage sustained by the 
owner thereoO ... " (Empha·sis added). 
In State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 31, 286 P.2d 785, 786, 
the rule is stated: 
"The defendant can prevail here only if the 
facts clearly establish that it has a present, direct 
and real interest in the lands thought to be con-
denmed by the State and defendant concedes this 
. " lS SO ... 
And later on page 788: 
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"\\' e believe and hold that to graft chargP, 
onto and create interest in real property, whichi.' 
the subject to condenmatioll, there mnst be dear 
and eo11vineing evidenC'e estahlishing sueh eharg1, 
01· interests, ... '' 
See State v. Valentiue, 10 Utah 2d 132, 349 P.2d 
:~:21, and Utah Road Commission v. Hanse11, J.t 
lTtah 2cl 305, 383 P.2d 917. 
The only allegation of propl'l'ty rights of plaintiff, 
is in paragraph 10 of the amended complaint, the crux 
or which is: 
''De fencla11 t, acting ... in concert with ... the 
enited States of America, Bureau of Reclama-
tion, did framlulently, unlawfully and malicionsh 
attempt to deprive plaintiffs of their rights and 
properties hereinabove set forth ... " 
The prior paragraphs of the amended complaint dis-
closes: (1) that Annie C. Maw entered into an agreement 
,,·ith the Ugden Duck Club dated December 29, 1936, 
wherein the named sons of Annie C. :Maw were entitled 
to shooting privileges in consideration of the granting 
to the Ogden Duek Club of a C'ertain right-of-way across 
the lands owne< l by ~\nnie C. ~law: ( 2) that the sucees- · 
so rs in interest of Annie C . .l\Iaw are ·w. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc. and Graee B. l\Iaw; (8) "Plaintiff Orlo S. 
Maw, aeting as President of \Y . .f ohn :Maw and Sons, 
Inc. and acting for and on behalf of the other plaintiffs. 
entered into the land purchase contract with the United 
States in reliance on the assurance and promise ... set 
forth in Exhibit B ancl would not luwe entered into said 
contract except for the assurances and promises ... 
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Plaintiffs acted to their damage"; and ( 4) the amount 
c1f damages claimed by the plaintiffs. 
To recover under the first 9 paragraphs of the 
;imended complaint the plaintiffs must (l) establish a 
right under the 1936 agreement; (2) the right was lost 
hy the conveyance of the property to the United States 
of America; (3) and arc third-party beneficiaries under 
the letter from defendant (Plaintiff,s' Exhibit D). The 
allegations of the amended eomplaint establish that the 
unly elaim against defendant is upon the assurances 
and promises contained in its letter to "\V .• John Maw and 
Sons, Inc. and Grace B. Maw, as third-party benefi-
ciaries and the alleged damages for failure to perform. 
" 
"A suit or action upon the contract ordinarily 
will not aff,ord an opportunity for a recovery of 
punitive damages." Weber v. Austin, 184 Ore. 
586, 200 p .2d 593-599. 
it is settled that punitive damages may not be 
awarded . . . in an action ba;sed on breach of contract 
even though defendant ',s breach was wilful or fraudu-
lent." Co-ntractor's Safety Association v. Californda 
Compensatory Ins. Co., 48 Cal.2d. 71, 307 P.2d 628-629. 
See also 25 C .• T.S., Damages, Sec. 120, p. 1128; 22 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 245, p. 337. This Court adopted 
the above rule in Graham v. Street, 14 Utah 2d 144, 270 
P.2d 458. 
In Mayberry v. W cstern Casualty & Surety Co., 173 
Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 824, 830, the exception to the rule is 
stated: 
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''I iere, as in that <'ase, no tortious act is alleg-e,: 
to han• hee11 cornmittc•(l iu connection 1vith th, 
alleged breaC'h of contract, and, as there said, thr 
mere use of \HJrds stwh as, 'wilfull~-, wantonh. 
fraudulently and oppresi1·ely' standing alone,;, 
iw1 a suhstit ute for esse11tial allegations disclu.' 
ing wanton arnl malicious conduct ... '' 
There is no alll'gatio11 in tl1e au1c•rnkd complaint 01 
any independent tortious adi,·it~· in <'01medion with thr 
breach of contrad, and 110 disclosure or any compensa-
tory damages suffered hy plaintiffs by the ads corn. 
plained of i11 paragraph 10. ~ince there is no offor of 
proof that plaintiffs haYe :-:ustained an~' compensahl~ 
damage because of the exeention and reeording of tht· 
Quit Claim Deed the rule announred in Gral1am v. Street, 
supra, at page 459, P.2d, is applicable: 
" ... the general rule is that there ean be no 
pnnitiYe damages 1vithout compensatory damages 
based on the tort. Gilham v. Devercau.r, 67 Mont , 
75, 214 P. 606, 33 A.L.R. 381. And see Falkcnbur!I 
v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008; Evans v. Gais-
fo·rd, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431; and case~ 
cited in annotation in 33 A.L.R. 384. Hence, the 
failure to allege and prove a tort giving rise to ' 
compensatory damages Yitiates the claim for 
punitive damage." 
The amended complaint in paragraph 10 claims that 
plaintiffs should be awarded punitfre and exemplary ' 
damages and this i~ carried into the prayN of said 
complaint. '' Generall~· jurisdietions which allow awarch 
of exemplary damages han a rule that there is no cause 
of action for exemplary damages alone.'' 22 Am. Jur. 
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2d, Daniages, Sec. 241, page 328. ~ee also the annota-
tion, 17 A.L.R. 2d 518 et seq. 
The plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant com-
mitted any tortious act against them. Eliminating all 
the extraneous matter it appears that the whole thrust 
of the claimed unlawful acts are, that someone misin-
formed the Ogden Duck Club that it was necessary to 
obtain a Quit Claim from it to ~\V .. John Maw and Sons, 
f nc. and Grace B. Maw so they could obtain their settle-
ment with the United States, and obtained and recorded 
the deed without knowledge of the plaintiffs or\\.,.. John 
J\law and Sons, Inc. and Grace B. Maw. 
Appellants contend that such acts were unlawful, 
fraudulent and malicious and constitute a fraud upon 
the grantees of said Quit Claim Deed. If so then, the 
grantees of such deed, \.V. John Maw and Sons, Inc. and 
Grace B. Maw are the persons defrauded hut they are 
not parties to thi,s action. The plaintiffs are strangers to 
the Warranty Deed to the United States and the Quit 
Claim Deed from the Ogden Duck Club and as strangers 
have no right to delivery of the deed, nor do they have 
any objection to its recording. Since they did not have 
the right to have the deed delivered to them as strangers 
it is difficult to see how any handling thereof could in 
any way affect them. 
The plaintiffs li.ave not pleaded facts upon which a 
daim upon which punitive damages could he awarded. 
and the trial court properly struck pragraph 10 and 
paragraph 2 of the prayer from the Amended Complaint. 
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CO~CLLl;SlON 
The trial court's di:,.;positio11 of tl1is case must \ii 
sustained because, ( 1) the 1 ~l:l(i right-of-way agl'ceme 11 : 
does not grant dtwk duh shooting pri,·ilcges for tl1< 
benefit oi' sons of deeeased son:-; of ~\nnie C. 1Iaw, (~ 1 
the findings of the trial court that the l~J;l(j agreement a, 
interpreted by usage estahlislwd oYcr a period of year, 
does not benefit tlw plaintiffs is full:· supported by com-
petent evidence, (3) the Fjeldstccl letter did not ('l'eat1· 
lie\\· duek hu11ting priYileges for the lJcnefit of the plain-
tiffs as third-party hencficiarie:-; and (4) the issue of, 
punitiYe damages was properly exdudecl. 
'Ye respeetfully rnbmit that the judgment appealed 
from must be affirmed. 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
E. J. SKEEN 
REID ,Y. NIELSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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